This study aims to examine the legitimacy of “judicial sanctions” as an emerging tool in the international system through a comparative analysis of Islamic jurisprudence and contemporary international law. Conducted using a descriptive–analytical approach, the research draws upon authoritative jurisprudential sources (both Shi’a and Sunni) and international judicial practices.



In the first section, the legal foundations of judicial sanctions in international law—including universal jurisdiction, individual criminal responsibility, and principles of fair trial—are extracted and analyzed in light of three cases: Omar al-Bashir, Vladimir Putin, and Saif al-Islam Gaddafi. Subsequently, jurisprudential concepts such as ḥajr (legal interdiction), taʿzīr (discretionary punishment), the authority of the Sharia judge, and the principle of “no harm” (lā ḍarar) are examined in relation to the legitimacy of judicial restrictions.



Analysis of the views of jurists such as Allama Hilli, Naraqi, Ibn Taymiyyah, and Al-Shatibi reveals that judicial restrictions are considered valid in Islamic jurisprudence only when four conditions are met: a legitimate authority, a legitimate objective, justice, and proportionality of the means.



Findings indicate that although the source of legitimacy and scope of jurisdiction differ between the two systems (divine in Islamic jurisprudence vs. contractual in international law), both systems share a commitment to judicial sanctions based on justice and deterrence. Consequently, judicial sanctions issued by international institutions can only be deemed acceptable from the perspective of Islamic jurisprudence if they simultaneously meet four criteria: competent authority, legitimate purpose, proportional means, and adherence to fair trial standards.



In conclusion, a four-pillar framework is proposed for assessing the legitimacy of judicial sanctions, enabling a critical and jurisprudentially compatible analysis of international sanctions.