International University of Islamic Denominations Fiqhe Moqaran 2322-1976 12 23 2024 06 21 Criminalization of non-payment of taxes from the perspective of Islamic Denominations and Iranian Law Criminalization of non-payment of taxes from the perspective of Islamic Denominations and Iranian Law 5 29 181803 10.22034/fm.2024.181803 FA Mahdi Rahbar Associate Professor, Department of Imami Jurisprudence and Law, Faculty of Islamic Jurisprudence and Law, International University of Islamic Denominations, Tehran, Iran 0009-0005-2238-3924 Mostafa Heydari M.A. Student, Faculty of Islamic Jurisprudence and Law, International University of Islamic Denominations, Tehran, Iran Journal Article 2023 07 01 Tax evasion in various forms and dimensions is one of the biggest obstacles to the smooth movement of this wheel, which in various ways causes disruption in the Islamic system, making the Islamic government ineffective and on the other hand, the emergence of economic corruption and rent-seeking and the accumulation of wealth in the hands of some and It creates pressure on the shoulders of others and in this way causes disruption of public order and disruption in the implementation of the provisions of the relevant laws. In this study, while examining such concepts of tax, tax evasion and other topics related to them, based on the analytical-descriptive method, an attempt has been made to prove that paying taxes is obligatory in Islamic jurisprudence, and failure to pay them is considered a crime and is punishable, and issues Such as the harmless rule, the disruption of the Islamic system, the inefficiency of the Islamic government, the emergence of economic corruption and rent-seeking, the disruption of public order, tax-related laws, and the disruption of the country's economic system. Tax evasion in various forms and dimensions is one of the biggest obstacles to the smooth movement of this wheel, which in various ways causes disruption in the Islamic system, making the Islamic government ineffective and on the other hand, the emergence of economic corruption and rent-seeking and the accumulation of wealth in the hands of some and It creates pressure on the shoulders of others and in this way causes disruption of public order and disruption in the implementation of the provisions of the relevant laws. In this study, while examining such concepts of tax, tax evasion and other topics related to them, based on the analytical-descriptive method, an attempt has been made to prove that paying taxes is obligatory in Islamic jurisprudence, and failure to pay them is considered a crime and is punishable, and issues Such as the harmless rule, the disruption of the Islamic system, the inefficiency of the Islamic government, the emergence of economic corruption and rent-seeking, the disruption of public order, tax-related laws, and the disruption of the country's economic system. https://fiqhemoqaran.mazaheb.ac.ir/article_181803_3461d7bce31452bf240f6a3076683d3c.pdf

International University of Islamic Denominations Fiqhe Moqaran 2322-1976 12 23 2024 06 21 A Critical Typology of Research Works on Apostasy (Irtidād) A Critical Typology of Research Works on Apostasy (Irtidād) 31 58 202122 10.22034/fm.2024.446566.2095 FA Mohammad Feizi PhD student at Jurisprudential Denominations, Faculty of Islamic Denominations, University of Religions and Denominations, Qom, Iran Kazem Ghazizadeh Assistant Professor, Department of Quran and Hadith Sciences, Faculty of Humanities, Tarbiat Modares University, Tehran, Iran Hossein Rajabi Assistant Professor, Department of Law and Comparative Jurisprudence, Faculty of Islamic Denominations, University of Religions and Denominations, Qom, Iran Journal Article 2024 03 03 The problem of apostasy (Irtidād) is multidimensional. An efficient, logical account of apostasy, free from personal preferences, requires a reexamination of the issue from various theological, jurisprudential, social, and political perspectives. Achieving well-rounded Islamic views regarding apostasy requires a comprehensive revisiting of this issue. In this line, the present article classifies articles and writings about apostasy, explores its seminarian and academic scholarly background, and identifies jurisprudential and theological skepticisms and gaps concerning the problem of apostasy. Using a critical paradigm, a qualitative approach, and library research, this article answers the following main question: What are the various types of jurisprudential fatwas and research on apostasy, and how have researchers approached this issue? A unique contribution of the present article is its classification and critique of various approaches. The problem of apostasy (Irtidād) is multidimensional. An efficient, logical account of apostasy, free from personal preferences, requires a reexamination of the issue from various theological, jurisprudential, social, and political perspectives. Achieving well-rounded Islamic views regarding apostasy requires a comprehensive revisiting of this issue. In this line, the present article classifies articles and writings about apostasy, explores its seminarian and academic scholarly background, and identifies jurisprudential and theological skepticisms and gaps concerning the problem of apostasy. Using a critical paradigm, a qualitative approach, and library research, this article answers the following main question: What are the various types of jurisprudential fatwas and research on apostasy, and how have researchers approached this issue? A unique contribution of the present article is its classification and critique of various approaches. https://fiqhemoqaran.mazaheb.ac.ir/article_202122_435c49d9692ea1cd1c73b58facd4bf89.pdf

International University of Islamic Denominations Fiqhe Moqaran 2322-1976 12 23 2024 06 21 A Jurisprudential–Legal Examination of the Scope and Criteria of Cognition and Discernment (A Comparative Study in Islamic Law, Statutory Law, and Developmental Psychology) A Jurisprudential–Legal Examination of the Scope and Criteria of Cognition and Discernment (A Comparative Study in Islamic Law, Statutory Law, and Developmental Psychology) 59 85 205943 10.22034/fm.2024.421929.2066 FA Mahdi Nasehi PhD student in Jurisprudence and Fundamentals of Islamic Law, Faculty of Jurisprudence and Islamic Law, International University of Islamic Denominations, Tehran, Iran Abdullah Mokhtari PhD student in Jurisprudence and Criminal Law, Faculty of Humanities, Shahid Motahari University, Tehran, Iran 0009-0005-1742-5843 Journal Article 2023 10 22 The concept of discernment (Tamyīz) in the discourse of jurists and legal scholars has consistently served as the dividing line between two categories of children. However, the question remains: what are the criteria for determining a child’s discernment? Using a descriptive–analytical research method, this study seeks to clarify the criteria of discernment and to determine its precise standard based on jurisprudential findings and cognitive sciences. Factors such as age, being in the stage of Murāhiq (early adolescence), the correct performance of an act, the child’s physical growth, and ultimately the child’s understanding and cognition are among the commonly cited limits and indicators of discernment. Nevertheless, the fundamental criterion of discernment is cognitive in nature. Accordingly, when a child is able to recognize the nature of actions, distinguish benefit from harm, and differentiate between good and bad, he or she has attained the level of understanding and discernment in question. Age and other indicators of discernment thus function merely as presumptive signs of this understanding. This cognitive capacity distinguishes the child from those in earlier developmental stages; hence, according to narrations, such a child is deemed ready to learn what is lawful and unlawful and is capable of complying with certain religious rulings. Article 91 of the Islamic Penal Code identifies three criteria: understanding the nature of actions, discerning moral good and evil, and comprehending the social consequences of one’s conduct. Based on these criteria, non-discerning minors, due to their lack of understanding of the nature of actions, fall outside the category of discernment. Discerning minors, however, in addition to understanding the nature of actions, also perceive moral good and evil; therefore, “their acts of worship are legally valid.” Yet, because they lack an understanding of the social consequences of their actions, their transactions—except for gratuitous acquisition—are void and without legal effect under Articles 1212 and 1215 of the Civil Code. Similarly, in criminal matters, and for the same reason, children are exempt from criminal responsibility pursuant to Article 146 and the substance of Article 91 of the Islamic Penal Code. The concept of discernment (Tamyīz) in the discourse of jurists and legal scholars has consistently served as the dividing line between two categories of children. However, the question remains: what are the criteria for determining a child’s discernment? Using a descriptive–analytical research method, this study seeks to clarify the criteria of discernment and to determine its precise standard based on jurisprudential findings and cognitive sciences. Factors such as age, being in the stage of Murāhiq (early adolescence), the correct performance of an act, the child’s physical growth, and ultimately the child’s understanding and cognition are among the commonly cited limits and indicators of discernment. Nevertheless, the fundamental criterion of discernment is cognitive in nature. Accordingly, when a child is able to recognize the nature of actions, distinguish benefit from harm, and differentiate between good and bad, he or she has attained the level of understanding and discernment in question. Age and other indicators of discernment thus function merely as presumptive signs of this understanding. This cognitive capacity distinguishes the child from those in earlier developmental stages; hence, according to narrations, such a child is deemed ready to learn what is lawful and unlawful and is capable of complying with certain religious rulings. Article 91 of the Islamic Penal Code identifies three criteria: understanding the nature of actions, discerning moral good and evil, and comprehending the social consequences of one’s conduct. Based on these criteria, non-discerning minors, due to their lack of understanding of the nature of actions, fall outside the category of discernment. Discerning minors, however, in addition to understanding the nature of actions, also perceive moral good and evil; therefore, “their acts of worship are legally valid.” Yet, because they lack an understanding of the social consequences of their actions, their transactions—except for gratuitous acquisition—are void and without legal effect under Articles 1212 and 1215 of the Civil Code. Similarly, in criminal matters, and for the same reason, children are exempt from criminal responsibility pursuant to Article 146 and the substance of Article 91 of the Islamic Penal Code. https://fiqhemoqaran.mazaheb.ac.ir/article_205943_a66dd9dbc551323003b766f42e6fa2ec.pdf

International University of Islamic Denominations Fiqhe Moqaran 2322-1976 12 23 2024 06 21 The Scope of Preferential Juristic Reasoning (Istihsānāt Tarjīḥī), Its Criteria, and Standards in the Views of Jurists of the Islamic Denominations The Scope of Preferential Juristic Reasoning (Istihsānāt Tarjīḥī), Its Criteria, and Standards in the Views of Jurists of the Islamic Denominations 87 106 190679 10.22034/fm.2024.405993.2055 FA Ayoob Ghaedi PhD student, Faculty of Islamic Jurisprudence and Law, International University of Islamic Denominations, Tehran, Iran 0009-0001-6886-8629 Mahmood Veisi Assistant Professor, Department of Shafi'i Jurisprudence and Law, Faculty of Islamic Jurisprudence and Law, International University of Islamic Denominations, Tehran, Iran 0000-0002-7915-2853 Shakiba Amirkhani Assistant Professor, Department of Imami Jurisprudence and Law, Faculty of Islamic Jurisprudence and Law, International University of Islamic Denominations, Tehran, Iran Journal Article 2023 09 09 Islamic jurists, in their effort to arrive at the divine rulings intended by the Sacred Lawgiver, have identified certain criteria and standards using preferential juristic reasoning (Istihsān Tarjīḥī). Over time, this practice has contributed to the expansion and development of this field of jurisprudence. Accordingly, the central question of this study is: what constitutes preferential juristic reasoning, what are its underlying criteria, and what are the governing rules of Istihsān Tarjīḥī within each of the four Sunni denominations? Based on this framework, the present research first introduces preferential juristic reasoning and its foundational criteria—namely, public interest (Maṣlaḥa), legal concession (rukhṣa), and necessity (Ḍarūra). It then examines the rules governing Istihsān Tarjīḥī in two distinct categories, general and specialized, within each of the four Sunni denominations: the Ḥanafī, Mālikī, Shāfiʿī, and Ḥanbalī Denominations, through a separate and detailed analysis. Using a descriptive–analytical method and relying on library-based sources, the study explores the view that when a qualified jurist gives due consideration to the criteria of public interest, necessity, and legal concession—the three foundational elements of this process—and defines their scope, he or she can effectively benefit from this preferential method of legal reasoning. Islamic jurists, in their effort to arrive at the divine rulings intended by the Sacred Lawgiver, have identified certain criteria and standards using preferential juristic reasoning (Istihsān Tarjīḥī). Over time, this practice has contributed to the expansion and development of this field of jurisprudence. Accordingly, the central question of this study is: what constitutes preferential juristic reasoning, what are its underlying criteria, and what are the governing rules of Istihsān Tarjīḥī within each of the four Sunni denominations? Based on this framework, the present research first introduces preferential juristic reasoning and its foundational criteria—namely, public interest (Maṣlaḥa), legal concession (rukhṣa), and necessity (Ḍarūra). It then examines the rules governing Istihsān Tarjīḥī in two distinct categories, general and specialized, within each of the four Sunni denominations: the Ḥanafī, Mālikī, Shāfiʿī, and Ḥanbalī Denominations, through a separate and detailed analysis. Using a descriptive–analytical method and relying on library-based sources, the study explores the view that when a qualified jurist gives due consideration to the criteria of public interest, necessity, and legal concession—the three foundational elements of this process—and defines their scope, he or she can effectively benefit from this preferential method of legal reasoning. https://fiqhemoqaran.mazaheb.ac.ir/article_190679_ea63c32a53405039bfd6f9390f57314d.pdf

International University of Islamic Denominations Fiqhe Moqaran 2322-1976 12 23 2024 06 21 Induction of an Epistemological Method in Discovering the Objectives of the Sharia from the Perspectives of Ibn Taymiyyah and al-Shāṭibī Induction of an Epistemological Method in Discovering the Objectives of the Sharia from the Perspectives of Ibn Taymiyyah and al-Shāṭibī 107 129 206567 10.22034/fm.2024.453503.2103 FA Saeid Karimi PhD student, Faculty of Literature and Humanities, University of Religions and Denominations, Qom, Iran 0009-0005-0126-1004 Mohammad Aghajani M.A. Student, Faculty of Law, Mofid University, Qom, Iran Journal Article 2024 04 21 One of the methods for discovering the objectives of the Sharia, as an epistemological approach, is induction (Istiqrāʾ). The aim of the present article is to explain and analyze induction from the perspectives of Ibn Taymiyyah and al-Shāṭibī. Both scholars are among the theorists of Maqāṣid al-sharīʿa who attribute particular value and significance to the inductive method, such that Ibn Taymiyyah is regarded as an authority in induction, and al-Shāṭibī refers to inductive reasoning in more than one hundred instances in his work al-Muwāfaqāt. Through induction within the Sharia, the threefold categories of interests—necessities (Ḍarūriyyāt), needs (Ḥājiyyāt), and embellishments (Taḥsīniyyāt)—as well as the five fundamental objectives of the Sharia, namely the preservation of religion, life, intellect, lineage, and property, are identified. The inductive method operates by examining individual pieces of evidence and narrations to arrive at general principles and conclusions that are not explicitly stated in the textual sources; rather, they are established in a manner analogous to Tawātur Maʿnawī (conceptual mass transmission), such as the well-known attribution of courage to Imam ʿAlī (peace be upon him) or generosity to Ḥātim. This insight constitutes one of the key findings of the present study. Furthermore, there are notable differences and distinctions between the inductive theories of al-Shāṭibī and Ibn Taymiyyah. From Ibn Taymiyyah’s perspective, restricting the objectives of the Sharia to five is not sound, and other interests present within Islam must also be taken into consideration. In other words, Ibn Taymiyyah’s overall approach focuses more on the application of induction in theology and doctrinal matters, whereas al-Shāṭibī places greater emphasis on its use in jurisprudence and legal theory. The research method employed in this article is descriptive–analytical. One of the methods for discovering the objectives of the Sharia, as an epistemological approach, is induction (Istiqrāʾ). The aim of the present article is to explain and analyze induction from the perspectives of Ibn Taymiyyah and al-Shāṭibī. Both scholars are among the theorists of Maqāṣid al-sharīʿa who attribute particular value and significance to the inductive method, such that Ibn Taymiyyah is regarded as an authority in induction, and al-Shāṭibī refers to inductive reasoning in more than one hundred instances in his work al-Muwāfaqāt. Through induction within the Sharia, the threefold categories of interests—necessities (Ḍarūriyyāt), needs (Ḥājiyyāt), and embellishments (Taḥsīniyyāt)—as well as the five fundamental objectives of the Sharia, namely the preservation of religion, life, intellect, lineage, and property, are identified. The inductive method operates by examining individual pieces of evidence and narrations to arrive at general principles and conclusions that are not explicitly stated in the textual sources; rather, they are established in a manner analogous to Tawātur Maʿnawī (conceptual mass transmission), such as the well-known attribution of courage to Imam ʿAlī (peace be upon him) or generosity to Ḥātim. This insight constitutes one of the key findings of the present study. Furthermore, there are notable differences and distinctions between the inductive theories of al-Shāṭibī and Ibn Taymiyyah. From Ibn Taymiyyah’s perspective, restricting the objectives of the Sharia to five is not sound, and other interests present within Islam must also be taken into consideration. In other words, Ibn Taymiyyah’s overall approach focuses more on the application of induction in theology and doctrinal matters, whereas al-Shāṭibī places greater emphasis on its use in jurisprudence and legal theory. The research method employed in this article is descriptive–analytical. https://fiqhemoqaran.mazaheb.ac.ir/article_206567_5a4b3f466fa1fd18e189f7cb5f93a881.pdf

International University of Islamic Denominations Fiqhe Moqaran 2322-1976 12 23 2024 06 21 A Comparative Study on the Feasibility of Privatizing the Judiciary in the Jurisprudence of Islamic Denominations A Comparative Study on the Feasibility of Privatizing the Judiciary in the Jurisprudence of Islamic Denominations 131 165 200451 10.22034/fm.2024.427350.2074 FA Ali Shia Ali Assistant Professor, Department of Jurisprudence and Fundamentals of Islamic Law, Shirvan Branch, Islamic Azad University, Shirvan, Iran 0000-0002-5121-7926 Seyed Mohsen Aziz Assistant Professor, Department of Jurisprudence and Fundamentals of Islamic Law, Faculty of Theology and Islamic Studies, Hakim Sabzevari University, Sabzevar, Iran 0000-0001-7969-4559 Journal Article 2023 11 27 Today, due to the increasing volume of cases before courts and the high costs of litigation, the question has arisen as to whether—given the permissibility, in Islamic jurisprudence, of receiving certain forms of income related to judicial activity and the existence of the institution of the arbitrator judge (Qāḍī al-Taḥkīm)—it is possible to conceive of a private judicial institution in Islam. This study, conducted through a comparative and cross-school analysis of Islamic jurisprudence (Shiʿi and Sunni), examines the possibility of privatizing the judiciary in Islamic law and, if feasible, the manner in which such privatization could be realized. In this context, a brief comparative examination of one contemporary legal system—the English judicial system—as an example of judicial privatization is also undertaken. The findings indicate that, in Islamic jurisprudence, the legislation of the arbitrator judge provides a basis for the possibility of judicial privatization. Moreover, it is permissible for a judge to receive financial compensation for undertaking judicial duties, whether in the form of a wage (Ujra) or a fee (Joʿl), even from the litigating parties. Accordingly, it is possible to establish an institution responsible for adjudicating people’s disputes, analogous to what is recognized in the institution of legal representation (agency). However, in view of the specific nature of criminal cases, the adjudication of such disputes must remain within the authority of the government and the official judicial system. Therefore, privatization is limited exclusively to private civil disputes. Today, due to the increasing volume of cases before courts and the high costs of litigation, the question has arisen as to whether—given the permissibility, in Islamic jurisprudence, of receiving certain forms of income related to judicial activity and the existence of the institution of the arbitrator judge (Qāḍī al-Taḥkīm)—it is possible to conceive of a private judicial institution in Islam. This study, conducted through a comparative and cross-school analysis of Islamic jurisprudence (Shiʿi and Sunni), examines the possibility of privatizing the judiciary in Islamic law and, if feasible, the manner in which such privatization could be realized. In this context, a brief comparative examination of one contemporary legal system—the English judicial system—as an example of judicial privatization is also undertaken. The findings indicate that, in Islamic jurisprudence, the legislation of the arbitrator judge provides a basis for the possibility of judicial privatization. Moreover, it is permissible for a judge to receive financial compensation for undertaking judicial duties, whether in the form of a wage (Ujra) or a fee (Joʿl), even from the litigating parties. Accordingly, it is possible to establish an institution responsible for adjudicating people’s disputes, analogous to what is recognized in the institution of legal representation (agency). However, in view of the specific nature of criminal cases, the adjudication of such disputes must remain within the authority of the government and the official judicial system. Therefore, privatization is limited exclusively to private civil disputes. https://fiqhemoqaran.mazaheb.ac.ir/article_200451_1ede6a57b1bcb2912fca6571e3af7876.pdf

International University of Islamic Denominations Fiqhe Moqaran 2322-1976 12 23 2024 06 21 The Ruling on Dispositions by the Party Subject to an Option (Man ʿAlayhi al-Khiyār) without the Permission of the Holder of the Option in the Five Islamic Denominations and Iranian Law The Ruling on Dispositions by the Party Subject to an Option (Man ʿAlayhi al-Khiyār) without the Permission of the Holder of the Option in the Five Islamic Denominations and Iranian Law 167 187 204095 10.22034/fm.2024.444947.2092 FA Ali Nosrati Assistant Professor, Department of Jurisprudence and Fundamentals of Islamic Law, Razavi University of Islamic Sciences, Mashhad, Iran Seyed Abolghasem Hosseini Zeidi Associate Professor, Department of Jurisprudence and Fundamentals of Islamic Law, Razavi University of Islamic Sciences, Mashhad, Iran Reza Barzegar Kalateh Bozorg PhD student, Razavi University of Islamic Sciences, Mashhad, Iran Journal Article 2024 02 21 Dispositions made by the party subject to an option (Man ʿAlayhi al-Khiyār) constitute a frequently encountered and practically significant issue. Such dispositions may either prevent the restitution of the object itself—such as when the object is destroyed—or may not impede its restitution, such as riding an animal or residing in a house. The latter type of disposition is not the subject of dispute and is considered permissible for the party subject to the option. With respect to the former type, however, if during the option period the party subject to the option undertakes dispositions in the object of the contract that conflict with the right of the option holder, and such actions are carried out with the seller’s permission, there is no objection to the validity and effectiveness of these dispositions; consequently, through such conduct, the option of the option holder is extinguished. By contrast, there is disagreement regarding the validity of dispositions undertaken by the party subject to the option without the permission of the seller. Relying on library-based sources and employing a descriptive–analytical method, the present study first outlines six viewpoints among Imāmī jurists, then refers to the opinions of the four Sunni denominations, and finally examines the issue from the perspective of the Iranian legal system. The study concludes that, according to the predominant view among jurists of the Islamic denominations and under Iranian Law, dispositions made by the party subject to the option with respect to the subject matter of the contract are permissible, and in the event that the option holder exercises the right of rescission, such dispositions are converted into a substitute (compensation). Dispositions made by the party subject to an option (Man ʿAlayhi al-Khiyār) constitute a frequently encountered and practically significant issue. Such dispositions may either prevent the restitution of the object itself—such as when the object is destroyed—or may not impede its restitution, such as riding an animal or residing in a house. The latter type of disposition is not the subject of dispute and is considered permissible for the party subject to the option. With respect to the former type, however, if during the option period the party subject to the option undertakes dispositions in the object of the contract that conflict with the right of the option holder, and such actions are carried out with the seller’s permission, there is no objection to the validity and effectiveness of these dispositions; consequently, through such conduct, the option of the option holder is extinguished. By contrast, there is disagreement regarding the validity of dispositions undertaken by the party subject to the option without the permission of the seller. Relying on library-based sources and employing a descriptive–analytical method, the present study first outlines six viewpoints among Imāmī jurists, then refers to the opinions of the four Sunni denominations, and finally examines the issue from the perspective of the Iranian legal system. The study concludes that, according to the predominant view among jurists of the Islamic denominations and under Iranian Law, dispositions made by the party subject to the option with respect to the subject matter of the contract are permissible, and in the event that the option holder exercises the right of rescission, such dispositions are converted into a substitute (compensation). https://fiqhemoqaran.mazaheb.ac.ir/article_204095_fd137b032cde46ea9bf491b177830215.pdf

International University of Islamic Denominations Fiqhe Moqaran 2322-1976 12 23 2024 06 21 An Analysis of the Nature of the Tasrīf Contract in Islamic Jurisprudence An Analysis of the Nature of the Tasrīf Contract in Islamic Jurisprudence 189 218 204864 10.22034/fm.2024.464819.2116 FA Mohammad Jamali Assistant Professor, Faculty of Theology and Islamic Studies, Tehran University, Tehran, Iran 0009-0004-9798-679X Mohammad Adel Ziaey Associate Professor, Faculty of Theology and Islamic Studies, Tehran University, Tehran, Iran 0000-0002-2212-2629 Farid Ahmad Afzali PhD student, Faculty of Theology and Islamic Studies, Tehran University, Tehran, Iran Journal Article 2024 06 26 The Tasrīf contract is among the agreements commonly used in both domestic and international commercial practice. In this contract, one of the contracting parties stipulates, either orally or in writing, that for reasons such as the inability to sell all or part of the goods, or the lack of need for some of them, any surplus may be returned to the seller. Given that the definitiveness of the transaction and the specification of the subject matter are among the conditions for the validity of financial contracts, and that this requirement appears to be surrounded by ambiguity in the Tasrīf contract, the question arises as to the juristic nature of this contract despite such uncertainty. What is the legal status of the stipulated condition therein? With regard to its nature and its comparison with conventional juristic contracts, despite similarities between the Tasrīf contract and agreements such as a sale with an option (Bayʿ wa Shart al-Khiyār), agency sale, and brokerage contracts—or, conversely, its lack of full conformity with them—it could be regarded as one of these contracts or as an independent contract. However, in view of the fact that the Tasrīf contract is concluded using the terminology of sale and stipulation, and that the ultimate intention of the contracting parties is a conditional sale, it appears that the Tasrīf contract is in essence a sale with a stipulation. This is because the two contracts share numerous similarities, to the extent that, despite the difference in terminology, they may be perceived as fundamentally identical. As for the stipulated condition in the Tasrīf contract, it may be concluded that such a condition does not contravene the essential nature of the contract and, therefore, does not render the contract invalid. The Tasrīf contract is among the agreements commonly used in both domestic and international commercial practice. In this contract, one of the contracting parties stipulates, either orally or in writing, that for reasons such as the inability to sell all or part of the goods, or the lack of need for some of them, any surplus may be returned to the seller. Given that the definitiveness of the transaction and the specification of the subject matter are among the conditions for the validity of financial contracts, and that this requirement appears to be surrounded by ambiguity in the Tasrīf contract, the question arises as to the juristic nature of this contract despite such uncertainty. What is the legal status of the stipulated condition therein? With regard to its nature and its comparison with conventional juristic contracts, despite similarities between the Tasrīf contract and agreements such as a sale with an option (Bayʿ wa Shart al-Khiyār), agency sale, and brokerage contracts—or, conversely, its lack of full conformity with them—it could be regarded as one of these contracts or as an independent contract. However, in view of the fact that the Tasrīf contract is concluded using the terminology of sale and stipulation, and that the ultimate intention of the contracting parties is a conditional sale, it appears that the Tasrīf contract is in essence a sale with a stipulation. This is because the two contracts share numerous similarities, to the extent that, despite the difference in terminology, they may be perceived as fundamentally identical. As for the stipulated condition in the Tasrīf contract, it may be concluded that such a condition does not contravene the essential nature of the contract and, therefore, does not render the contract invalid. https://fiqhemoqaran.mazaheb.ac.ir/article_204864_0b6b4cecf7e67947e396a0d36afa7eee.pdf

International University of Islamic Denominations Fiqhe Moqaran 2322-1976 12 23 2024 06 21 Critique of the Jurisprudential and Legal Foundations for Prohibiting a Wife's Employment without the Husband's Permission Critique of the Jurisprudential and Legal Foundations for Prohibiting a Wife's Employment without the Husband's Permission 219 254 200452 10.22034/fm.2024.446761.2096 FA Seyed Mohammad Hadi Razavi Khankahdani Level 4 Scholar, Qom Seminary, Qom, Iran 0009-0009-9018-9401 Journal Article 2024 03 03 A wife's employment has always been a challenging jurisprudential and legal issue in marital relations, with various opinions expressed on the matter. One of the most significant issues related to a wife's employment is whether she is permitted to work outside the home without the husband's permission. Clarifying this issue can lead to the adjustment of marital relations, reducing conflicts, and ultimately resolving many related legal disputes in the judicial system. Contemporary jurists and legal scholars have addressed this issue concerning the quality of the parties' agreement during, before, and after the marriage contract. They have identified four bases considering the prohibition of a wife's employment as one of the husband's established rights. These bases include: rebellion (Nushuz), the husband's authority (Qiwamah), incompatibility with the husband's rights, and contradiction with the welfare of the wife and family. This research aims to review the foundations for prohibiting a wife's employment without the husband's permission from a jurisprudential and legal perspective, using a descriptive-analytical method and library resources. The issue of a wife's employment in this study is examined without addressing situations where the parties have agreed on employment or its lack. The novelty of this research lies in its approach to the foundations independent of the parties' agreement, the new organization of arguments, the distinction between welfare and the absence of harm in the family institution, and specific critiques based on the implications of evidence, rational custom, and Arabic lexicon. This aspect, despite being explicitly stated by some narrators' commentators and lexicographers, has not been addressed in previous works on this issue. The findings of this research indicate that among the foundations for prohibiting a wife's employment, the three bases of rebellion, the husband's authority, and incompatibility with the husband's rights do not sufficiently support the common claims of jurists and legal scholars. However, "consideration of welfare" in certain cases, where the wife's job contradicts the interests of the wife or the family, can hinder her employment. A wife's employment has always been a challenging jurisprudential and legal issue in marital relations, with various opinions expressed on the matter. One of the most significant issues related to a wife's employment is whether she is permitted to work outside the home without the husband's permission. Clarifying this issue can lead to the adjustment of marital relations, reducing conflicts, and ultimately resolving many related legal disputes in the judicial system. Contemporary jurists and legal scholars have addressed this issue concerning the quality of the parties' agreement during, before, and after the marriage contract. They have identified four bases considering the prohibition of a wife's employment as one of the husband's established rights. These bases include: rebellion (Nushuz), the husband's authority (Qiwamah), incompatibility with the husband's rights, and contradiction with the welfare of the wife and family. This research aims to review the foundations for prohibiting a wife's employment without the husband's permission from a jurisprudential and legal perspective, using a descriptive-analytical method and library resources. The issue of a wife's employment in this study is examined without addressing situations where the parties have agreed on employment or its lack. The novelty of this research lies in its approach to the foundations independent of the parties' agreement, the new organization of arguments, the distinction between welfare and the absence of harm in the family institution, and specific critiques based on the implications of evidence, rational custom, and Arabic lexicon. This aspect, despite being explicitly stated by some narrators' commentators and lexicographers, has not been addressed in previous works on this issue. The findings of this research indicate that among the foundations for prohibiting a wife's employment, the three bases of rebellion, the husband's authority, and incompatibility with the husband's rights do not sufficiently support the common claims of jurists and legal scholars. However, "consideration of welfare" in certain cases, where the wife's job contradicts the interests of the wife or the family, can hinder her employment. https://fiqhemoqaran.mazaheb.ac.ir/article_200452_5deaba5aac259b1a70493d7cad18c149.pdf

International University of Islamic Denominations Fiqhe Moqaran 2322-1976 12 23 2024 06 21 Peaceful Coexistence in the Practice of the Prophet of Islam (PBUH) in His Encounters with Opponents Peaceful Coexistence in the Practice of the Prophet of Islam (PBUH) in His Encounters with Opponents 255 272 210152 10.22034/fm.2024.415425.2062 FA Mohammad Jafari Harandi Associate Professor at Department of Jurisprudence and Fundamentals of Islamic Law, Faculty of Humanities, Yadegar-e- Imam Khomeini (RAH) Shahre Rey Branch, Islamic Azad University, Tehran, Iran Journal Article 2023 09 30 One of the issues worthy of careful reflection concerns the manner in which the Prophet of Islam (PBUH) governed the society under his authority. In matters of governance and the implementation of rulings—rather than their legislation—the question arises as to whether the methods he adopted should be regarded as binding legal norms, or whether they were prudential measures contingent upon the specific circumstances of the time. Although various discussions have addressed this issue, much of the existing literature lacks a rigorous scientific approach and is largely shaped by the beliefs and convictions of its authors. A crucial yet often overlooked point in these discussions is the need to distinguish between actions carried out in the realm of implementation, based on the Prophet’s discretion and judgment, and those established by divine revelation. From a chronological perspective, the conduct of the Prophet (PBUH) may be divided into two distinct periods: his residence in Mecca, which lasted for more than thirteen years following his prophetic mission, and his residence in Medina, which spanned slightly over ten years. With regard to the nature of opposition and the opposing groups, four categories may be identified: the polytheists of Mecca, the Jews, the hypocrites residing in Medina, and the nomadic tribes and disbelieving Arabs. An examination of the Prophet’s conduct toward his opponents indicates that, prior to resorting to coercion or force, he predominantly relied on patience, forbearance, and gentleness. This approach—particularly his endurance of persecution over a period of thirteen years—cultivated steadfast and loyal companions who later supported him in times of hardship and peril. It was through the efforts of these individuals that the foundations of Islam and its governing system were firmly established. One of the issues worthy of careful reflection concerns the manner in which the Prophet of Islam (PBUH) governed the society under his authority. In matters of governance and the implementation of rulings—rather than their legislation—the question arises as to whether the methods he adopted should be regarded as binding legal norms, or whether they were prudential measures contingent upon the specific circumstances of the time. Although various discussions have addressed this issue, much of the existing literature lacks a rigorous scientific approach and is largely shaped by the beliefs and convictions of its authors. A crucial yet often overlooked point in these discussions is the need to distinguish between actions carried out in the realm of implementation, based on the Prophet’s discretion and judgment, and those established by divine revelation. From a chronological perspective, the conduct of the Prophet (PBUH) may be divided into two distinct periods: his residence in Mecca, which lasted for more than thirteen years following his prophetic mission, and his residence in Medina, which spanned slightly over ten years. With regard to the nature of opposition and the opposing groups, four categories may be identified: the polytheists of Mecca, the Jews, the hypocrites residing in Medina, and the nomadic tribes and disbelieving Arabs. An examination of the Prophet’s conduct toward his opponents indicates that, prior to resorting to coercion or force, he predominantly relied on patience, forbearance, and gentleness. This approach—particularly his endurance of persecution over a period of thirteen years—cultivated steadfast and loyal companions who later supported him in times of hardship and peril. It was through the efforts of these individuals that the foundations of Islam and its governing system were firmly established. https://fiqhemoqaran.mazaheb.ac.ir/article_210152_2054518f64771a7898b1b5d0a1e146cc.pdf

International University of Islamic Denominations Fiqhe Moqaran 2322-1976 12 23 2024 06 21 An Examination of the Legal Status of Arsh after the Waiver of the Option Due to Defect in Islamic Jurisprudence and Iranian Law An Examination of the Legal Status of Arsh after the Waiver of the Option Due to Defect in Islamic Jurisprudence and Iranian Law 273 296 205944 10.22034/fm.2024.435409.2085 FA Mahdi Miri PhD student, Razavi University of Islamic Sciences, Mashhad, Iran/Level 3, Khorasan Seminary, Mashhad, Iran 0000-0001-5632-407X Farzaneh Karami PhD, Razavi University of Islamic Sciences, Mashhad, Iran 0009-0004-7406-4143 Jafar Zanganeh Shahraki Assistant Professor, Department of Law, Razavi University of Islamic Sciences, Mashhad, Iran 0000-0002-1522-4897 Journal Article 2024 01 13 The waiver of the option due to defect (Khiyār al-ʿAyb) by the buyer results in the loss of the right of restitution; however, regarding the right to claim Arsh in Islamic jurisprudence, opinions differ. Some scholars maintain that with the waiver of the option due to defect, the right to claim Arsh is also extinguished, while others reject this view. In Sunni jurisprudence, the waiver of the option due to defect—sometimes expressed under terms such as “acceptance of the defect”—is stated to result in the loss of both the right of restitution and the right to Arsh. Compared to the Imāmī perspective, which maintains the persistence of the Arsh claim, this view has little standing. Civil law in Iran does not explicitly address this issue, and this lack of clarity has resulted in divergent judicial practices. This study, using a descriptive–analytical method, proposes a contemporary approach aligned with modern necessities and societal norms. According to this perspective, the waiver of the option due to defect does not extinguish the right to Arsh, on the grounds that Arsh has an independent and distinct nature from Khiyār al-ʿAyb and serves as a compensatory mechanism when the sold item is defective. The right to Arsh is not opposed to the price; rather, it functions as a tool to mitigate losses in cases of defect. Given its exceptional nature in the context of Khiyār al-ʿAyb, the waiver does not affect or diminish the right to Arsh. In cases of doubt regarding whether the waiver of Khiyār al-ʿAyb nullifies the right to Arsh, the principle of non-extinguishment prevails. Therefore, the primary purpose of waiving all options is to reinforce the contract and affirm its enforceability, without affecting the right to Arsh. The waiver of the option due to defect (Khiyār al-ʿAyb) by the buyer results in the loss of the right of restitution; however, regarding the right to claim Arsh in Islamic jurisprudence, opinions differ. Some scholars maintain that with the waiver of the option due to defect, the right to claim Arsh is also extinguished, while others reject this view. In Sunni jurisprudence, the waiver of the option due to defect—sometimes expressed under terms such as “acceptance of the defect”—is stated to result in the loss of both the right of restitution and the right to Arsh. Compared to the Imāmī perspective, which maintains the persistence of the Arsh claim, this view has little standing. Civil law in Iran does not explicitly address this issue, and this lack of clarity has resulted in divergent judicial practices. This study, using a descriptive–analytical method, proposes a contemporary approach aligned with modern necessities and societal norms. According to this perspective, the waiver of the option due to defect does not extinguish the right to Arsh, on the grounds that Arsh has an independent and distinct nature from Khiyār al-ʿAyb and serves as a compensatory mechanism when the sold item is defective. The right to Arsh is not opposed to the price; rather, it functions as a tool to mitigate losses in cases of defect. Given its exceptional nature in the context of Khiyār al-ʿAyb, the waiver does not affect or diminish the right to Arsh. In cases of doubt regarding whether the waiver of Khiyār al-ʿAyb nullifies the right to Arsh, the principle of non-extinguishment prevails. Therefore, the primary purpose of waiving all options is to reinforce the contract and affirm its enforceability, without affecting the right to Arsh. https://fiqhemoqaran.mazaheb.ac.ir/article_205944_8a034785c8d48f6cb01b3bcfc3b627c9.pdf

International University of Islamic Denominations Fiqhe Moqaran 2322-1976 12 23 2024 06 21 An Investigation of Loud and Quiet Recitation of Al-Fātiḥa and Sūrah in Daily Prayers from the Perspective of Islamic Denominations An Investigation of Loud and Quiet Recitation of Al-Fātiḥa and Sūrah in Daily Prayers from the Perspective of Islamic Denominations 297 327 205945 10.22034/fm.2024.447175.2099 FA Seyed Mahdi Ahmadi Nik Assistant Professor, Department of Jurisprudence and Fundamentals of Islamic Law, Razavi University of Islamic Sciences, Mashhad, Iran/ Lecturer, Khorasan Seminary, Mashhad, Iran 0000-0001-6976-1471 Seyed Ali Delbari Associate Professor, Department of Quranic and Hadith Sciences, Razavi University of Islamic Sciences, Mashhad, Iran Hossein Raftari Level 4 Scholar, Khorasan Seminary, Mashhad, Iran Journal Article 2024 03 07 One of the debated issues among jurists of the Islamic denominations concerns the loud (Jahr) and quiet (Ikhfāt) recitation during prayer. The term “recitation” (Qirāʾah) encompasses not only Al-Fātiḥa and Sūrah but also the opening supplication (Istiʿādhah), Basmala, and the four Tasbīḥs. This study examines the following questions: What is the ruling on reciting Al-Fātiḥa and a Sūrah in daily prayers from the perspective of Shīʿī and Sunni jurists with regard to loud and quiet recitation? In addition, what is the ruling on recitation in the third and fourth units (Rakʿahs) of prayer? According to the dominant opinion among Shīʿī jurists, quiet recitation of Al-Fātiḥa and a Sūrah in the Zuhr and ʿAsr prayers is obligatory for both men and women, whereas loud recitation in the Maghrib and ʿIshā prayers is obligatory only for men. In contrast, some Sunni jurists regard this ruling as recommended (Mustahabb), while others consider it discretionary, although the Shāfiʿī denomination aligns with the Shīʿī position. Furthermore, the majority of Shīʿī jurists and most Shāfiʿī scholars hold that quiet recitation in the third and fourth units is obligatory, whereas other Sunni jurists consider it recommended. This study, adopting a descriptive–analytical approach, reviews the opinions and reasoning of the various denominations, aiming to clarify the Shīʿī and Sunni perspectives and to provide grounds for adopting the “correct” view, namely the dominant opinion of Shīʿī jurists and the majority of Shāfiʿī scholars. One of the debated issues among jurists of the Islamic denominations concerns the loud (Jahr) and quiet (Ikhfāt) recitation during prayer. The term “recitation” (Qirāʾah) encompasses not only Al-Fātiḥa and Sūrah but also the opening supplication (Istiʿādhah), Basmala, and the four Tasbīḥs. This study examines the following questions: What is the ruling on reciting Al-Fātiḥa and a Sūrah in daily prayers from the perspective of Shīʿī and Sunni jurists with regard to loud and quiet recitation? In addition, what is the ruling on recitation in the third and fourth units (Rakʿahs) of prayer? According to the dominant opinion among Shīʿī jurists, quiet recitation of Al-Fātiḥa and a Sūrah in the Zuhr and ʿAsr prayers is obligatory for both men and women, whereas loud recitation in the Maghrib and ʿIshā prayers is obligatory only for men. In contrast, some Sunni jurists regard this ruling as recommended (Mustahabb), while others consider it discretionary, although the Shāfiʿī denomination aligns with the Shīʿī position. Furthermore, the majority of Shīʿī jurists and most Shāfiʿī scholars hold that quiet recitation in the third and fourth units is obligatory, whereas other Sunni jurists consider it recommended. This study, adopting a descriptive–analytical approach, reviews the opinions and reasoning of the various denominations, aiming to clarify the Shīʿī and Sunni perspectives and to provide grounds for adopting the “correct” view, namely the dominant opinion of Shīʿī jurists and the majority of Shāfiʿī scholars. https://fiqhemoqaran.mazaheb.ac.ir/article_205945_692c40a04ce2a49bad9d9b430fc9382e.pdf