نوع مقاله : مقاله پژوهشی
نویسنده
دانشیار دانشگاه آزاد اسلامی شهرری
چکیده
کلیدواژهها
عنوان مقاله [English]
نویسنده [English]
In their books on Islamic jurisprudence, Imāmīyya jurists consider the concept of reason/ rational argument along with the Book of Allah, the Sunnah and Consensus as various ways for inferring Islamic rules, unanimously agreeing that reason/ rational argument can be used for reaching religious rules. The use of rational argument is mainly discussed under the categories of Mustaqillat Aqliyah (the independently rational), Istilzamat Aqliyah (the dependently rational), non-literal proofs; proofs other than those which are in statements, such as the Sunnah and Consensus), Tanqih al-Manat (extraction of the underlying reason) and Fahm al-Maay’ir (understanding of criterion). However, when it comes to the use of analogy – particularly of the inferred type – to establish religious rules, these jurists defy rational argument definitively, arguing that it cannot infer the underlying reason, after making references to Islamic narratives that forbid acting based on analogy. But we are faced with a critical question: How is that reason/ rational argument, with all its importance and breadth, is rejected when it comes to analogy whereas it is the basis for inferring religious rules in the above-mentioned cases, and perhaps in some other cases as well, at least for Mujtahids? The present undertaking emphasizes that the underlying reason of a religious rule, as inferred by and as the product of rational argument which is a valid source for inferring rules, can be used as criterion elsewhere too and it, thus, should not be devalued against a rule which is established independently by pure reason. As a result, analogy as apparently refuted in the Imamiyya School should not be read in the common sense of the term. Rather, textual arguments that refute analogy signify a completely different thing.
کلیدواژهها [English]
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